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Architectural Vulnerabilities in Plug-and-Play Systems
Taylor Corrello, M.S.
Rochester Institute of Technology, 2018
Supervisor: Dr. Mehdi Mirakhorli
Plug-and-play architectures enhance systems’ extensibility by providing
a framework that enables additional functionalities to be added or removed
from the system at their runtime. Such frameworks are often implemented
through a set of well-defined interfaces that form the extension points for the
pluggable functionalities. However, the plug-ins can increase the applications
attack surface or introduce untrusted behavior into the system. Designing
a secure plug-and-play architecture is critical and non-trivial as the features
provided by plug-ins are not known in advance. In this paper, we conduct an
in-depth study of seven systems with plug-and-play architectures. In total,
we have analyzed 3,183 vulnerabilities from Chromium, Thunderbird, Firefox,
Pidgin, WordPress, Apache OfBiz, and OpenMRS whose core architecture is
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based on a plug-and-play approach. We have also identified the common secu-
rity vulnerabilities related to the plug-and-play architectures, and mechanisms
to mitigate them by following a grounded theory approach. We found a total
of 303 vulnerabilities that are rooted in extensibility design decisions. We also
observed that these plugin-related vulnerabilities were caused by 15 different
types of problems. We present these 15 types of security issues observed in the
case studies and the design mechanisms that could prevent such vulnerabili-
ties. Finally, as a result of this study, we have used formal modeling in order to
guide developers of plug and play systems in verifying that their architectures
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Plug-and-play architectures are widely adopted in many application
domains to enhance systems’ extensibility, reusability and modifiability [12].
For instance the automotive industry is rapidly creating plug-and-play archi-
tectures where software modules slot into the overall electronic architecture
without unexpectedly disrupting other modules [28]. In the finance domain,
plug-and-play architectures provide universal APIs for in-store point of sale
(POS) systems and enable plugging a variety of different applications into the
POS system at the merchant. In medical device development, the plug-and-
play architectures are used to enhance programs and medical device interop-
erability, where third-party medical applications are plugged into networked
medical devices to provide diagnosis, treatment, research, safety and quality
improvements, and equipment management features[6, 7].
In plug-and-play architectures, the software is decomposed into a “core”
component representing the plug-and-play environment of the host application
and a set of bundles representing “plug-ins”. The plug-and-play environment
provides the software’s main functionalities and a runtime infrastructure for
plug-ins. Plug-ins provide bundled functionalities which can be added at run-
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time, making the software customizable and extensible. This means that the
software product can be released early, and new features can be added later
through plug-ins. It also means that the software can be customized to address
specific needs of specific instances. Moreover, plug-and-play architectures can
enable contributions from third-party vendors because extending the architec-
ture does not require access to the source code, but instead, these third-party
developers can implement well-defined public interfaces provided by the plug-
and-play environment.
Although plug-ins are useful for adding new features to the software,
they can increase the application’s attack surface or introduce untrusted be-
havior. Designing a secure plug-and-play architecture is critical and non-trivial
as the features provided by plug-ins are not known in advance and inclusion
of the third party functions can negatively affect the systems security and
trustworthiness [14, 43]. There are numerous vulnerabilities reported for plug-
and-play architectures [38, 44, 49, 56]. For instance, a group of researchers have
demonstrated how hackers can wirelessly access the critical driving functions
of a vehicle through an entire industry of Internet-enabled gadgets plugged
directly into cars’ dashboards to monitor vehicles’ location, speed and effi-
ciency [26]. In this case, the plug-in was insecure, however, severe security
and privacy issues could also occur when the system accepts malicious plug-
ins [37].
Although there are numerous studies in the area of plug-and-play soft-
ware architectures [67, 68], their applications in various domains [8, 28, 36] and
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securing domain-specific examples of such extensible architectures [11, 15], we
currently lack an empirically grounded work that aims to understand common
types of vulnerabilities that are associated with plug-and-play software archi-
tectures as well as novel mitigation techniques to prevent such vulnerabilities.
Therefore, in this paper, we follow a grounded theory approach to derive a the-
ory around the domain of vulnerabilities in plug-and-play software systems1.
We strictly followed the classical version of the grounded theory, and ana-
lyzed vulnerability reports of several open source systems with plug-and-play
architecture.
The contributions of our work are:
• An in-depth discussion of common types of vulnerabilities in plug-and-
play software architectures based on data from real, widely used plug-
and-play projects.
• An empirically grounded presentation of architectural mitigations that
could prevent or minimize the impacts of common types of security is-
sues.
• A reference security architecture for plug-and-play software systems ver-
ified by formal modeling.
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents background on
grounded theory. Chapter 3 provides an overview of our study’s methodol-
1Our data is released at: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/
1LmZuuRaEtSbpE\_TYrOrrAIlQ-cF63-\_B
3
ogy. Chapter 4 provides the common types of plug-and-play vulnerabilities
we observed in the case studies. Chapter 5 provides an evaluation of our data
collection approach. Chapter 6 provides the formal modeling of some of our
mitigation strategies. Chapter 7 presents the threats to the validity of this




A grounded theory [31] approach is a progressive identification and inte-
gration of concepts from data that leads to the construction of theories directly
supported by empirical data. Grounded Theory is well-known for having dif-
ferent variants [62]. These differences lie on the role of the literature and the
data analysis process. The classical grounded theory [29] encompasses the
following activities: identification of topic of interest, theoretical sampling, data
coding (through open, selective, and theoretical coding), constant comparative
analysis, memo writing, memo sorting and write up & literature review.
Defining the Phenomena Under Study.
Researchers are advised against formulating a specific research question up-
front, but rather, define an area of interest (i.e., the phenomena under
observation) [29]. The idea is that the research question should also emerge
from the data at hand, such that it minimizes the potential biases incurred by
having a pre-defined research question.
Theoretical sampling
Researchers perform their data collection procedures via theoretical sampling,
which is the process of jointly collecting and analyzing data in order to de-
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cide what data needs to be collected next [29]. In conventional sampling
approaches, the data collection is preplanned with the aims of increasing the
statistical generalizability of the results [62]. However, in theoretical sam-
pling, the data collection process is guided by the earlier rounds of sampled
data, which identify knowledge gaps that need further explanation, thereby
requiring more rounds of data collection [31].
Coding of Data
As data is collected, researchers start their data coding processes. In classical
grounded theory there are two types of codes that are resultant of these coding
processes: substantive codes and theoretical codes. Substantive codes are con-
cepts and properties that emerge from the data and reflect the nature of the
phenomena under study. Theoretical codes, on the other hand, integrate the
substantive codes by indicating how they relate with each other, forming the
hypotheses to be integrated into the theory. While substantive codes are the
outcomes of open coding and selective coding, theoretical codes emerge from
the theoretical coding process.
In the initial phases of data analysis, researchers perform open coding
which consists on analyzing each of the incidents (i.e.,, data points) in order to
annotate them with codes (concepts). The open coding can be performed at
different levels of granularity (line-by-line, paragraph-by-paragraph, etc) [30,
31]. These codes are constantly refined throughout the open coding process,
leading to the emergence of a core category and its associated concepts.
The core category is the main concern or problem observed in the phenomena
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under study [29]. As stated by Glaser in his seminal work, the core category
“accounts for a large portion of the variation in a pattern of behaviour” [29].
Once the core category is identified, researchers perform the selective
coding of data, in which further data collection and analysis are delimited
and focused in saturating the core category. This means that the coding
continues until the theory’s concepts are fully supported by the data, and no
new concepts are observed (theoretical saturation is achieved).
The last phase of coding is the theoretical coding phase which in-
volves establishing the relationships between the substantive codes, leading to
the development of hypotheses that would integrate to our theory. Theoretical
coding involves the application of a coding paradigm [31]. Glaser [29] defined
a list of coding families that could help researchers to interconnect concepts
derived from the data during their theoretical coding process.
Memo Writing (or “Memoing”)
Throughout the data analysis, researchers take notes in “memos”. These
memos capture any insights of the researcher and consists of “logs” of the
process of developing the theory.
Constant Comparative Analysis
One crucial aspect in developing a solid theory is to constantly compare inci-
dents and concepts with each other in order to identify similarities and differ-
ences between emerging concepts. This process of comparing back and forth
between codes and incidents is crucial to ensure same level of granularity of
7
concepts.
Write Up & Literature Review
The last stage occurs when we achieve a theoretical saturation, in which all the
concepts that are part of the theory are fully supported by the data, and there
is no knowledge gap (i.e., hypotheses that need further clarification through
an additional round of data collection and analysis). At this last stage, the
researcher writes up his/her theory. Subsequently, the researcher performs a
literature review with the aim to compare and augment the originated theory
against the theories described in the literature. The literature review is delayed
until the theory is fully developed to prevent any biases during the analysis [29].
The output of this process is a theory. A theory consists of a series
of interconnected concepts that offers an explanation about a problem (core
category) in a given context and how that main concern is handled [31]. In
other words, it is a narrative based on the evidence from the data that can





























































Figure 3.1: The Grounded Theory Approach Applied to our Work
We used the classical grounded theory [29] as a systematic inductive
method for conducting qualitative research of software vulnerabilities in plug-
and-play architectures, aimed toward theory development for the common
vulnerabilities of plug-and-play architectures, as well as their mitigation tech-
niques. We chose this approach due to its emphasis on the emergence of
concepts [30, 62], i.e., high emphasis on an inductive rather than a deductive
data analysis. Since we do not know in advance the nature of the vulnera-
bilities (except a high-level knowledge that they are rooted in plug-and-play
systems), our goal was to allow the data to drive our process of discover-
ing classes of plug-and-play vulnerabilities (inductive reasoning) rather than
formulating hypotheses throughout the analysis process (deductive reasoning).
Figure 3.1 shows how we applied the classical grounded theory to our research.
We explain this process in the subsections that follow.
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Figure 3.2: Information model for the collected data.
3.0.1 Limiting the Phenomena Under Study
In following a grounded theory approach, instead of forming initial
research questions we define an area of interest. As illustrated in Figure 3.1,
the focus of this study is vulnerabilities in plug-and-play software systems.
We focused on vulnerabilities specific to the plug-and-play architecture - i.e.,
security issues that are enabled due to the extensibility mechanisms provided
by plug-and-play environments and are specific to such architecture.
These vulnerabilities are a subset of the total vulnerabilities that can be
exploited in the system, because we are only focusing on the ones that result
from including plug-in mechanisms in the architecture. These plug-in related
vulnerabilities can be caused by malicious or benign-but-buggy1 plug-ins.
1Benign-but-buggy plug-ins refers to the plug-ins that have a benign behavior that con-
tains a security defect that can be used by attackers to exploit the application core. [11]
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3.0.2 Data Collection: Theoretical Sampling
Given the topic of interest of this work, we needed access to software
vulnerability reports, the description of these vulnerabilities, in-depth discus-
sion about how they occurred and were fixed, as well as information about
the architectural decisions of the projects affected by these security problems.
Therefore, we targeted data sources that are freely accessible to us. In this
context, we focused on open source systems with a plug-and-play software
architecture.
3.0.2.1 Theoretical Sampling
We began by sampling two open source projects, Chromium, and
Thunderbird to extract and analyze their vulnerability reports. From an
initial analysis of these reports, we observed that Thunderbird and Chromium
had overlapping concepts since they were from a similar domain. Therefore,
we included more projects in which we extracted and analyzed their vulner-
abilities. The additional projects were Firefox, WordPress, and Pidgin.
Although Firefox and Chromium were from the same domain, adding them
could help us pinpoint problems that are only applicable to Web browsers and
other concepts that are more generalizable. In the later stages (after we identi-
fied our core categories), we sampled more open source projects from different
domains. We included OpenMRS and Apache OfBiz for further analysis
and to support the findings of our theory.
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3.0.2.2 Data Sources
We used the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) to extract vulner-
ability meta-data, the Issue Tracking Systems to obtain further discussions
about the problem, the Source Code Repositories to identify fixes for these
vulnerabilities and Technical Documents that explain the underlying plug-and-
play mechanisms of the affected software project. The process of extracting
data from these sources is described below:
• Retrieving vulnerabilities from NVD : We obtained the vulnerability re-
ports from the National Vulnerability Database through parsing their
public data feeds [47]. Vulnerabilities disclosed in NVD are assigned
a unique Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Identifier (CVE ID).
Along with this identifier, vulnerabilities tracked by NVD contain a con-
cise description of the problem, a list of affected software releases, and
a list of Web sites that can be used as references and can contain more
details about the problem [47].
• Identifying vulnerability details from Issue Tracking Systems : Although
CVE reports provide a brief description of the security problem, they do
not contain a detailed discussion about the vulnerability such that we
could verify its underlying root cause, consequences and other informa-
tion. Therefore, we also identified URLs to the corresponding bug entry
of the issue tracking system of the case study. This way, we could read
the developers’ discussion about the problem and the process they used
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to come up with a solution. To do so, we leveraged the list of “refer-
ences” for the CVE and identified which of these links referred to the
issue tracking system of the corresponding case study.
• Collecting vulnerability patches from Source Code Repositories : To re-
trieve patches that fixed vulnerabilities, we extracted the commits that
referred to the corresponding bug entry in the issue tracking systems (i.e.,
commits whose message explicitly mentions the bug id). These patches
contain the files that were affected (i.e., modified, added or removed) in
the fix. The identification of the patches helps us to verify what solution
was applied by developers to repair the software.
• Identification of design decisions for enabling Plug-and-Play : We re-
viewed available literature, existing technical documentation, posts in
the projects issue tracking systems and existing architectural diagrams
of each case study in order to identify their design decisions for sup-
porting plug-and-play feature and any security mechanism adopted for
protecting their plug-and-play environment. We also review their source
code to understand the structure of the application and technical de-
cisions. This review was conducted using a keyword search, manually
browsing the source code, reading any code comments or “readme” files,
as well as the release reports. We compiled our findings in a trace matrix
which enumerates where each plug-and-play mechanism is implemented
in the source code. Each project’s trace matrix of plug-and-play design
decisions to source files was peer reviewed.
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3.0.2.3 Data Fusion
By the end of an iterative data collection and theoretical sampling
process, we collected a total of 3,183 vulnerability reports (CVEs) and as-
sociated data. Figure 3.2 shows the information model of the vulnerability
data we have collected after performing the steps enumerated above. We used
three complementary approaches to identify the subset of vulnerabilities (CVE
instances) that were associated with the plug-and-play architecture of these
systems. These approaches were:
• Component-Based Approach: The issue tracking entries to fix CVEs of-
ten have an attribute indicating the affected software component, which
is declared by the original developers of the project. Thus, we lever-
aged this component tag to identify CVEs that are potentially related
to their extensible architecture. To do so, we defined a list of component
tags that are associated with the plug-and-play architecture of each case
study. This list was established after a careful review of the projects’
technical documents and source code. Next, we filtered all the issue
tracking reports whose bug matched the component tag of our subset.
Lastly, we traced the bug ids of these entries back to their associated
vulnerabilities (CVE instances) in order to identify the subset of CVEs
that are potentially related to securing their extensible architecture.
• Keyword-Based Approach: a list of keywords was established that re-
flected the terminology used by the developers to refer to the plug-and-
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Table 3.1: Keywords used for automatically filtering CVEs
Case Study Keywords
Firefox extension, bundle, theme, add on, add-on, addon, plugin, plug-in, dictionary, xpi, pack
Chromium extension, plug-in, plugin, app
Thunderbird extension, bundle, theme, add on, add-on, addon, plugin, plug-in, dictionary, xpi, pack
Wordpress plug-in, plugin, theme
Pidgin plug-in, plugin
OfBiz plug-in, plugin
OpenMRS plug-in, plugin, add on, add-on, addon
play architecture of each case study. These keywords were searched on
the descriptions of the retrieved CVEs to identify those related to plug-
ins. Table 3.1 enumerates the keywords used per case study.
• File-Based Approach: The traceability matrix of plug-and-play mecha-
nisms to source files, developed during our data collection (Section 3.0.2.2)
was used to locate plug-in related source files. The plug-in related CVEs
were identified by mapping the files in the trace matrix to the source
files affected by CVEs.
The goal of these three complementary approaches was to maximize the
recall of all CVEs related to the plug-and-play architecture. Table 3.2 shows
the total number of retrieved CVEs (column “# CVEs”), how many of these
CVEs were selected after applying the three previous approachs (column “#
Analyzed CVEs”), and lastly the total number of CVEs related to plug-and-
play architecture after a manual review (“# Plugin-related CVEs”).
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Table 3.2: Statistics of the vulnerability data used in this study.
Case Study # CVEs # Analyzed CVEs # Plugin-related CVEs
Firefox 1396 156 68
Chromium 1252 169 73
Thunderbird 704 85 37
Wordpress 433 221 91
Pidgin 69 34 32
OfBiz 7 1 1
OpenMRS 4 1 1
3.0.2.4 Data Preprocessing
After collection, merging and filtering of the CVE reports, preprocess-
ing was conducted in order to summarize the data for the analysts to start
the coding of the data based on grounded theory. The data preprocessing was
performed by five individuals with security background, who systematically
scrutinized the subset of CVEs that were identified using the three complimen-
tary automated approaches described in the previous step. These individuals
summarized the vulnerability reports by filling out a form containing specific
sections for the:
• Context : underlying scenario in which the vulnerability occurred;
• Problem: why it occurred (fine-grained root cause);
• Solution: how it was fixed;
These summaries are important for us to minimize the information load when
coding and constantly comparing a large amount of data. All summaries are
16
also released through the link to study package.
3.0.3 Open Coding
After preparation of the data, the first step was the open coding of
the vulnerability summaries. Five security researchers with an average of two
years experience in the security domain conducted the open coding practice.
During this process, they analyzed each of the plugin-related CVE summaries,
reviewed its context, problem, and solution that were collected previously (and
any other details available in the issue tracking system or other sources as
needed). After reviewing the CVE information, researchers collaboratively
highlighted the key points in the summaries, then based on these key points
they assigned codes to the vulnerability. The codes were used as delegates
for concepts and key points involved in vulnerability. Figure 3.3 lists all the
initial codes generated by the analysts through the open coding process and
their frequencies (number of CVEs presented with the code). Please note,
that many of these codes in further iterations have been grouped into core
categories.
Figure 3.3 shows the summary report collected for three CVEs. For
instance, in case of CVE-2015-4498, the key points are highlighted in red
color: add-on installation, allows remote attackers to bypass an intended user-
confirmation, warns the user, bypass this install warning dialog, installation of
the add-on will start without the dialog, and block cross-origin add-on install
request. Then each of which are assigned a code, example of codes generated
17
CVE-2015-4498
Description: The add-on installation feature in
Firefox before 40.0.3 allows remote attackers to
bypass an intended user-confirmation require-
ment by constructing a crafted data: URL and trig-
gering navigation to an arbitrary http: or https:
URL.
Problem: Normally, Firefox warns the user
when trying to install an add-on if this install re-
quest was initiated by a We page. This warning
needs to be explicitly accepted for the add-on to
continue installing. However, there is one excep-
tion in which the dialog will not be shown, which is
when the user pastes the direct link in the URL bar.
An attacker could leverage this exception scenario
to bypass this install warning dialog. Basi-
cally, an attacker could create links to Web pages
that redirects to the location of the add-on’s bun-
dle (XPI file). When the user clicks on the link,
the Web browser will follow the chain of redirects,
and the installation of the add-on will start
without the dialog.
Solution: Fix is to block cross-origin add-on
install requests.
Codes: “Not showing install warning dialog”,
“Silent install of plug-ins”, and “Block cross-origin
install requests”.
CVE-2011-3055
Description: The browser native UI
in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83
does not require user confirmation
before an unpacked extension instal-
lation, which allows user-assisted re-
mote attackers to have an unspecified
impact via a crafted extension.
Problem: An attacker was able to
gain access to the extensions man-
agement page and get it to load an
unpacked extension with an NPAPI
plugin (see also bug 117715 ) with-
out generating a prompt. Look-
ing at the code in UnpackedIn-
staller::OnLoaded, it looks like it
should generate a prompt in all
cases unless the extension is dis-
abled.
Solution: The fix is to generate the
same prompts for packed and un-
packed extensions. This also fixes
an issue where we were not prompting
for unpacked extensions with plugins at
installation time.
Codes: “Not showing install warn-
ing dialog”, “Silent install of plug-ins”,
“Consistent generation of install warn-
ing prompts”.
CVE-2012-0934
Description: A PHP remote
file inclusion vulnerability in
ajax/savetag.php in the Theme
Tuner plugin for WordPress before
0.8 allows remote attackers to exe-
cute arbitrary PHP code via a
URL in the tt-abspath parameter.
Problem: A remote attacker could
send a specially-crafted URL
request to the savetag.php script
using the tt-abspath parameter to
specify a malicious file from a re-
mote system. This allows the at-
tacker to execute arbitrary code
on the Web server.
Solution: Fix was to remove the
part of the code that leveraged
on user-provided input to in-
clude PHP code.
Codes: “Arbitrary code execu-
tion”, “File path traversal”, “Re-
mote code file inclusion”.
Figure 3.3: Examples of open coding of CVEs
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for this summary are: Not showing install warning dialog ; Silent install of
plug-ins ; Block cross-origin install requests.
3.0.4 Constant Comparison Method
The codes emerging from each CVE summary were constantly com-
pared against the existing codes to observe commonalities and differences
(which could result in further break down of these codes into more fine-grained
levels). Emerging codes were compared against other vulnerability reports in
order to observe their properties (such as potential mitigations and types of
consequences). Furthermore, CVE instances were compared against other vul-
nerability reports to establish uniformity of concepts and identify variations.
Through constant comparison, security researchers observed that some key
points reoccurred, then such key points were used to form the core categories.
For instance, in Figure 3.3 the key points for CVE-2015-4498 and CVE-2011-
3055 are similar, and they have been assigned codes such as “Not showing
install warning dialog”, or “Silent install of plug-ins”.
Then, emerging concepts are compared to more incidents to generate
new theoretical properties of the concepts and more hypotheses. The goal
of the constant comparative method is to ensure that all the concepts are
supported by the data and at the same level of granularity. As the analysts
performed the analysis, they were either annotating the CVEs with existing
tags or creating new codes that emerged (i.e., the existing tags are not suitable
for the CVE being analyzed). For instance, in case of CVE-2012-0934 (Fig-
19
ure 3.3) none of existing codes for CVE-2015-4498 and CVE-2011-3055 could
represent it, therefore, we created new codes for it.
The result of this open coding and constant comparative analysis
iteration is the identification core categories [29]. In our study, our core
categories correspond to the types of plug-and-play vulnerabilities and













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.4: Codes that resulted from our open coding process
3.0.5 Memoing
Throughout the iterative process of open coding and constant com-
parative analysis, the researchers captured their insights in memos. A shared
Google Document with predefined tables was used to to capture early insights.
In these early stages of data analysis, our memos mostly concerned potential
core categories (plug-and-play vulnerabilities) and as the process continued we
finalized them by adding more detailed information about consequences and
20
mitigation techniques. For these potential core categories, these memos would
capture a summary of the type of architectural violation, associated conse-
quences and how it can be mitigated. Table 3.3 illustrates a sample memo
captured by an analyst during the memoing process.





Memo#19: Unsanitized plugin data  
Problem:​ The core application interacts with data from the plugins. The problem 
arises when this data is not properly sanitized. The application host trusts data 
from the plug-in when it shouldn't because this data is crossing boundaries. 
Mitigation: ​Introduce mechanisms that sanitize the data flowing from plugins to 
the core application.  
Consequence(s): ​Arbitrary code execution, Denial of service  
Some observed examples: 
- ​CVE-2005-0752 [Firefox]: The Plugin Finder Service (PFS) in Firefox before 1.0.3 
allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a javascript: URL in the 
PLUGINSPAGE attribute of an EMBED tag. 
- CVE-2013-0896 [Chrome]: BrowserPluginGuest trusts the shared memory region 
sizes passed in messages from renderers. When the browser attaches to these 
regions it does not sanity check the region sizes and can be made to write beyond 
the end of the mapped region. 
- CVE-2012-5328 [WordPress]: Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in the Mingle 
Forum plugin 1.0.32.1 and other versions before 1.0.33 for WordPress might allow 










Tag #4: Reentrant Event Callbacks 
Architectural Violation: ​Reentrant event callbacks 
This problem occurs when extensions can interrupt the execution of the event dispatching mechanism before it has finished,                  
resulting in an unpredictable state. 
Architectural Mitigation:  
Given that multiple events may arrive and need to be dispatched to many plug-ins, it is important to ensure that the callback                      
mechanism at the application host perform these operations in an atomic fashion. To mitigate the problem: while performing the                   
dispatch of the event to the corresponding extensions this operation is designed to be atomic such that it guarantees the correctness                     
of the initialization (avoid to leave the extension in an invalid state). It can be done so through a locking mechanism. 
Consequence(s): 
● Availability ​: it can cause a crash due to this corrupted state 
Some observed examples: 
● CVE-2016-1635 [Chrome]: Apps & extensions can make the callback routine to be invoked reentrantly, resulting in a crash                  
(use-after-free) 
● CVE-2013-2912 [Chrome]: The resource tracker tries to use the object which is half destructed. 
● CVE-2015-6772 [Chrome]: Re-entrancy while attaching a new document in a frame when an old document is being                
detached  (use-after-free) 
8   
3.0.6 Selecting Coding
The selective coding of our methodology focused on theoretically
saturating the architectural and related concepts. In this step, we go back
to the CVE instance that were associated with these architectural viola ions
in order to further refine these violations, capturing all possible consequences
observed in the data, and how developers mitigated them. In this and later
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stages of our analysis, our memos encompassed theory development, in which
we focused on rearranging our core categories for establishing our cohesive
theory.
3.0.6.1 Data Analysis Instrument
It is important to highlight that we used a custom-built Web-based tool
to support our activities of coding the data. This Web tool presents to the
researcher the information retrieved for each vulnerability report (Figure 3.2),
and enables the researcher to annotate the report, and tag codes (i.e., concepts)
to the report.
3.0.7 Memo Sorting
At the ending stages of our data analysis, we conceptually sorted our
memos. By sorting we do not imply a chronological order, instead, the sorting
of our notes based on inter-related concepts. The goal of this sorting is to look
at the data at a higher-level of abstraction.
3.0.8 Theoretical Coding
In the later stages of our analysis, we employed theoretical coding in
order to interconnect substantive codes, leading to the development of hy-
potheses that would integrate to our theory. As explained in Section 2, the
theoretical coding involves the application of a coding paradigm [31]. In this
coding process, we integrated our concepts and structured them into contexts,
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which are the underlying scenario of the plug-and-play vulnerability, causes,
that are the contributing factors that lead to the vulnerability, and the conse-
quences of the vulnerabilities.
3.0.9 Literature Review & Write Up
The last step of our methodology is writing our theory. In this writing
process, we also performed a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) to compare
and cross-reference findings from our theory with respect previous work.
The search strategy [72] of our literature review consisted in a manual
search for works from four sources: the ACM Digital Library, IEEE Explore Li-
brary, ScienceDirect, and Springer Link. Our inclusion criteria were as follows:
the work was (i) a full paper; and (ii) focused on discussing security problems
on plug-and-play software architectures. Exclusion criteria were (i) position
papers, short papers, tool demo papers, keynotes, reviews, tutorial summaries,
and panel discussions; (ii) not fully written in English; (iii) duplicated study
and (iv) focusing on a research problem not in the domain of plug-and-play
software architectures. In our manual search, we used the following search
query: (plug-in OR plugin OR extension) AND (security OR vulnerability OR vul-
nerabilities).
From our manual search we collected a total of 11,053 papers. We
applied our inclusion and exclusion criteria through reading the paper’s title,
abstract and keywords (if existent), resulting in a remainder of 33 papers.
These remaining papers were carefully reviewed, where we focused on verifying
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to what extent the findings from our theory were new (the novelty of our





Through this in-depth study, we identified 15 common types of security
problems that occur in plug-and-play systems. Table 4.1 shows a concise view
of the findings organized with the the types of plug-and-play vulnerabilities,
their context and consequences.
In the following subsections, we describe all the results within their
identified context (e.g. plug-and-play functional context )
Table 4.1: Findings overview
Context Types of Plug-and-Play Vulnerabilities Consequences Mitigation
Plug-ins 
Installation
Incorrect user notification of plug-in permissions Gain privileges, Spoofing, User-assisted attack - Central install point: all the installation requests are guaranteed to go through this component, who is in charge of (i) consistently 
generating install warning prompts before any install requests; (ii) showing all the requested permissionsBypassing user notification for plug-in installation Stealth installation of malicious plug-ins
Lack of plug-in’s configuration file sanitization
Arbitrary code execution, Privilege elevation, 
Data leakage, Directory path traversal, 
Application crash
- Configuration validator: it ensures that configuration files are not used as an attack vector, through typed parsing and validation 
of configuration files.
Improperly checking the origin of an install request Spoofed origin of an install request, Misleading the user to install a malicious plug-in
- Whitelist of install origins: Specification of the only allowed install points that can trigger the installation, avoiding that 
malicious code or other vectors silently install a plug-in.
Update Plug-ins Elevation of privilege through a plug-in update Privilege elevation - Lifetime enforcement of plug-in permissions: Comparing against previously list of permissions provided by plug-in during install
Plug-in Registry 
Management
Extraction/storage of plug-in with world-
readable/writable permissions or in unsafe 
directories
Modify/Erase plug-in data, Replace a benign 
plug-in with a malicious one, Execute 
unauthorized code, Symlink attack




Lack of compartmentalization of plug-ins Arbitrary code execution - Compartmentalization of plug-ins: Each plug-in must be encapsulated in a separate compartment.- Isolated object domains: Each compartment must have its own copy of objects for communication with the PnP environment. 
Lack of fine-grained and modular permission 
setting Overprivileged plug-in
- Fine-grained, modular, permission assignment.
- Declarative-based request for accessing data/functionality.
Allowing a plug-in to elevate its permission by 
manipulating (or delegating a task to) a process in 
the PnP environment that has higher privileges
Arbitrary code execution, Privilege elevation
- Limit plug-ins exposure to OS processes: Leveraging a mechanism that intermediates any system call between the sandboxed 
child process and the underlying OS to prevent the low-privileged process to attempt to communicate with other higher-privileged 
processes.
- Limit plug-ins exposure to High privilege PnP APIs: The access that plug-ins have to higher privileged APIs provided by the 
core application should be limited according to the permissions they have asked for and the privileges they have.   
Improper object access control in 
compartmentalized PnP environment
Arbitrary code execution, Disrupt the PnP 
execution environment, Privilege elevation
- Security Policy Enforcement through Object Wrappers: Adoption of different types of object wrappers that acts as proxies for a 
real object residing in a different compartment. These wrappers apply a security policy which enforces what type of properties and 
operations would get accessed by the callee compartment depending on the relationship between the caller and the callee 
compartments.
Unsanitized plugin data
Cross-site scripting (XSS), Steal credentials, 
Code injection, Arbitrary code execution, 
Memory corruption, SQL Injection
- Input validation of incoming plug-in data: Data transferred by plug-ins to the PnP Environment must be sanitized.
Improper origin check of requests by plug-ins
Plug-ins tampering with other plug-ins, Data 
leakage to unintended plug-ins, Arbitrary code 
execution, Same-origin policy bypass
- Origin check: Verifying request origins and authenticating plug-ins requests against a security policy.
Improper isolation of objects used by plug-ins in 
PnP environment
Override intended extension behavior, Data 
leakage to unintended plug-in, Bypass protection 
mechanism, Application crash, Sandbox and 
compartment escape, Overwrite memory, Code 
injection
- Isolated object domains: Each plug-in has its own copies of objects inside PnP Environment, minimizing the risk of the same 
object being used by another plug-in. The PnP environment manages these objects (which object is owned by who) and enforces 




Plug-ins requests are handled without authorizing 
plugins that initiate the request.
Plug-ins tampering with other plug-ins, Data 
leakage to unintended plug-ins, Arbitrary code 
execution
- Authorize the source of request: Upon a request, PnP host must authorize the plugin that initiates a request or subscribes to an 
event.
- Decomposition of events: events are decomposed into sensitive and non-sensitive events. Listeners can only subscribe to 
sensitive events if and only if they have enough permissions.
- Hide PnP internal events: Events and APIs specific to PnP environment must be hidden from plugins.
Reentrant event callbacks Unexpected State, DoS: PnP environment crash - Atomic event dispatcher: dispatch events in an atomic fashion
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4.0.1 Plug-in Install
One of the most basic features in a plug-and-play system is to load and
install new plug-ins to the application at runtime. In this context, we found
the following types of problems:
4.0.1.1 Incorrect user notification of plug-in permissions
When a new plug-in is added to the system, it can request access to
certain data/functionality provided by the plug-and-play environment. This
problem occurs when the plug-and-play environment does not (or incorrectly)
shows the list of data and/or functionality that will be accessed by the plug-in
before the plug-in is installed.
– Consequences : It opens space to user-assisted attacks, in which the user
is misled to trust and consequently accept the install of a potentially over-
privileged plug-in. This results in plug-ins being able to gain privileges,
and perform unintended activities, such as access sensitive data (data
leakage).
– Mitigation: Similar to the vulnerability “Bypassing user confirmation
for plug-in installation” (Section 4.0.1.2) the mitigation is to adopt a
Central Install Point that would display a list of all the permissions being
requested by the plug-in (besides consistently generating for mitigating
the problem discussed in Section 4.0.1.2).
– Evidence: We found two cases of this vulnerability in our data analy-
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sis. In our SLR we found further evidence [65] of this vulnerability, in
which the authors experimented with malicious extensions in Chrome
and developed a “browshing’ (browser + phishing) attack.
4.0.1.2 Bypassing user confirmation for plug-in installation
Whenever a new install is requested, the plug-and-play environment
should ask the user for consent to proceed (or abort) the install. This type
of vulnerability is caused by not strictly enforcing a requirement to have all
install requests mediated by the user.
– Consequences : It can result in stealth installation of malicious plug-ins.
Since these plug-ins were silently installed, an attacker could leverage
this to perform arbitrary malicious activities, such as stealing data.
– Mitigation: It consists of having a Central Install Point in which all the
installation requests, regardless of how initiated, are guaranteed to go
through this central installation component. This component ensures
that the install process of a plug-in is designed to prompt the user for
consent before proceeding with the install.
– Evidence: We found six CVEs that were caused by this type of problem.
Our SLR did not yield any results in this category. As an example,
by design, Firefox does not ask the user to confirm the install of an
add-on if the URL to the add-on was copied and pasted directly into
the browser’s address bar. The underlying assumption is that it did
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not represent a risk because the end-user was the one who typed the
URL. Although this design helps to improve usability, attackers could
leverage this design decision to silently install their malicious extensions,
as reported in CVE-2015-4498. They would create a Web page that has a
direct link to the malicious add-on bundle (XPI file), naming it with any
well-known benign extension. Once the user clicks on the link, Firefox
will download and install without any confirmation.
4.0.1.3 Lack of plug-in’s configuration file sanitization
This problem is caused by not validating the plug-in’s configuration file
in order to verify whether it is structurally correct, and also escape/neutralize
any code that is injected into the plug-in’s configuration file.
– Consequences : A malicious extension or a faulty benign plug-in may
contain a malformed configuration file (e.g. omitting required fields or
injecting code in the fields). Such issue could result in various secu-
rity risks such as crash of plug-and-play environment, a directory path
traversal, or data leakage. Malicious extensions could leverage this vul-
nerability to inject arbitrary code and perform numerous unintended
activities (such as installing another plug-in).
– Mitigation: Validating mechanisms must be established and applied be-
fore the plug-in is added to the registry. For instance, the plug-and-play
environment can define a typed data structure that specifies the expected
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data type in each field within the configuration file. Each raw field in the
configuration file is converted to the corresponding field in the typed data
structure. This typed data structure is validated, in which a validator
properly escapes and neutralizes any code injected in one of the config-
uration file’s fields. Then, if the validation was successful, this typed
data structure is passed to the initialization routine that will perform
the necessary tasks for adding the plug-in to the plug-in’s registry.
– Evidence: We observed six CVEs that were caused by this problem.
Through our SLR, we did not discover any research paper that identified
this type of vulnerability.
4.0.1.4 Improperly checking the origin of an install request
This vulnerability occurs when the plug-and-play environment accepts
install requests initiated either by the user or an external entity (i.e., a remote
install), but it does not check (or incorrectly checks) the source of an install
request.
– Consequences : A malicious plug-in can be installed in the plug-and-play
environment.
– Mitigation: It can be fixed through defining a white list of the trusted
remote sources that are allowed to trigger an install.
– Evidence We identified five CVEs that are a result of this plug-and-play
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vulnerability type. Through our SLR we did not find any research paper
that identified this type of vulnerability.
4.0.2 Plug-in Updates
Updating plug-ins is a basic feature in a plug-and-play system. It allows
third party developers to provide new features and bug fixes for their plug-ins.
In this context, we found the following types of problems:
4.0.2.1 Elevation of privilege through a plug-in update
This vulnerability occurs when plug-ins specify a list of privileges upon
install and the user accepts these permissions. However, the plug-and-play
environment does not check for the changes in privileges of plug-ins after an
update, thus bypassing the user’s consent. Therefore, a plug-in can elevate its
permissions through a plug-in update, and without user consent.
– Consequences : This vulnerability allows users to accept the installation
of a seemingly innocuous extension. However, after an update the per-
missions are elevated, and this can be leveraged to perform malicious
activities.
– Mitigation: Permissions need to be enforced at lifetime: once a user
confirms a set of permissions during install, these cannot be elevated at
any period of time.
– Evidence: Although we found only one case in our analysis, similar prob-
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lems related to updates have been discussed by other authors in the lit-
erature. In a study of Firefox extensions, the authors point to the fact
that Firefox did not previously perform integrity checks on the exten-
sions after they had been installed, including after updates where these
extensions could elevate their privileges or become malicious in other
ways [56].
4.0.3 Plug-in Registry Management
It is important for a plug-and-play system to keep a registry of installed
plug-ins. However, with this registry, the following types of problems were
found to occur:
4.0.3.1 Extraction/Storage of Plug-in with world readable/writable
permissions or in unsafe directories
In general, plug-ins are released as software bundles (e.g., zip files) that
are extracted by the plug-and-play environment. When the plug-and-play
environment extracts and/or stores these bundles using world-readable (or
writable) permissions (e.g. 777 permissions in Unix-based operating systems),
any other plug-in or potentially external process can alter plug-ins’ data or
code.
– Consequences : An insecure storage of plug-ins means that trojans could
modify plug-in data, alter plug-in functionality, or execute unauthorized
code.
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– Mitigation: Each plug-in’s bundles (configurations, scripts, binaries and
other related artifacts) must be stored in a read-only storage dedicated
to that plug-in.
– Evidence: In our analysis we found three cases of unsafe extraction/s-
torage of plug-ins. Through our SLR we found a work by Birsan et al
(pg. 5) [14], that argues that defining a secure shared location can be
particularly challenging in a multi-user environment. “The new plug-ins,
private to that user, cannot be installed in the read-only, shared install
location, so the product should allow users to install and configure extra
plug-ins in a location where they have more privileges.”.
4.0.4 Plug-and-Play Execution Environment
In regards to the plug-and-play execution environment, we found the
following types of problems:
4.0.4.1 Lack of compartmentalization of plug-ins
This vulnerability type is caused by a lack of a well-defined logical
compartment to isolate plug-ins from each other and from the plug-and-play
environment.
– Mitigation: There are two complementary ways of fixing this vulnerabil-
ity. The first one is to create logical compartments and make operations
outside that compartment limited and intermediated by the plug-and-
32
play environment. The second approach is to create isolated object do-
mains, as discussed in Section 4.0.4.7.
– Evidence: This vulnerability type appeared in 23 vulnerability reports.
In our SLR, we found studies that reflected issues related to the lack
of compartmentalization in Telematic Control Units in automobiles[26]
and in extensions of Python [63]. Others [13] developed a tool to detect
such issue.
4.0.4.2 Lack of fine-grained and modular permission setting
Many vulnerabilities observed in our analysis were due to benign plug-
ins that had more privileges than needed to implement their features. A
fine-grained and modular permission setting could have limited the access of
such plug-ins.
– Consequences : Over-privileged plug-ins can expose the plug-and-play
environment to a full compromise. Through a vulnerability in the plug-
in, attackers would have access to any functionality and data of the
plug-and-play environment.
– Mitigation: Modularize the plug-and-play environment into different
fine-grained related functions with specific privileges. Plug-ins will gain
access to specific functions, but not all.
– Evidence: Twenty four vulnerabilities were caused by this lack of a mod-
ular permission setting. In our SLR we found a study of over-privileged
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extensions in Firefox [10, 38, 56]. The lack of fine-grained permissions
rendered the Telematic Control Unit vulnerable to full control from all
attackers that can obtain access to the USB port [26].
4.0.4.3 Allowing a plug-in to elevate its permission by manipulating
(or delegating a task to) a process in the plug-and-play
environment that has higher privileges
The vulnerability arises from the scenario in which a plug-in, executing
in a unprivileged process, tampers with a high-privileged process in order to
escape its security boundaries.
– Consequences : A malicious plug-in could execute arbitrary code in higher
privileged context.
– Mitigation: This problem can be mitigated by limiting plug-ins’ exposure
to high privilege plug-and-play APIs. Furthermore, OS system calls
to other processes running in the underlying operating systems must
be prevented. This means leveraging a mechanism that intermediates
any system call between the plug-in and the underlying OS. The second
mitigation technique is to limit the access to higher-privileged APIs.
– Evidence: There were three instances of CVEs in our dataset. In our
SLR we found one paper discussing this issue [38].
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4.0.4.4 Improper object access control and compartmentalization
enforcement
When plug-ins are isolated in different logical compartments, they com-
municate with each other through object proxies that enforce compartment’s
access policy. Security issues can occur when the plug-and-play environment
uses an incorrect proxy for the inter-compartments communication.
– Consequences : Each plug-in may have a different set of permissions to
use certain functionality; therefore, when their object proxies are in-
correct, a lower privileged plug-in may leverage the proxy of a higher-
privileged plug-in to elevate its privileges and execute arbitrary code. It
can also be used as a mechanism to disrupt the plug-and-play execution
environment.
– Mitigation: The plug-and-play environment enforces security policies
through object wrappers, which act as proxies for a real object residing
in a different compartment. These wrappers are instantiated and used
according to the relationship between the caller and the callee compart-
ments. Each type of object wrapper enforces a different type of security
policy, which indicates the properties and operations would get accessed
by the callee compartment.
– Evidence: We have observed five CVEs caused by the incorrect usage of
object proxies. In our SLR we found a study that used crafted malicious
Firefox extensions [56], to show how they can gain access to any DOM
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structure. Authors recommended limiting plug-ins’ DOM access. A
similar solution relying on named-based access control is recommended
in [40] to keep untrusted software, i.e. extensions, from tampering
with the plug-and-play environment. We also encountered studies that
analyzed detection of insecure components in general [39], and studies
that dealt with fine-grained security policy that would limit the access
control of plug-ins specifically [53].
4.0.4.5 Unsanitized plug-in data
The core application interacts with data from the plug-ins. Security
problems arise when the plug-and-play environment trusts data from the plug-
in and, therefore, it does not properly sanitize the data.
– Consequences : this vulnerability results in a number of issues that are
resultant of improper validation of inputs, such as cross-site scripting
(XSS), stealing credentials, code injections (e.g. SQL injection), arbi-
trary code execution, memory corruption, and crashes.
– Mitigation: Adoption of an input validation mechanism that intercepts
and sanitizes the data flowing from plug-ins to the core application.
– Evidence: We found 56 CVEs in this category. In our SLR, we found sev-
eral papers that studied various individual plug-ins of WordPress. Sev-
eral plug-ins have been found to be vulnerable to XSS and SQL injection
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attacks [19, 20, 22, 44, 49, 51, 60, 64, 66]. These papers also discussed ap-
proaches to make each individual plug-in more secure. In contrast, our
approach identified mechanisms to secure the plug-and-play environment
and to lessen the impact of such vulnerable plug-ins.
4.0.4.6 Improper origin check of requests by plug-ins
This problem can result in a security breach when the plug-and-play
environment fails to correctly check the origin of requests (i.e., who was the
plug-in that initiated a call), therefore allowing the elevation of privilege at-
tack.
– Consequences : Since the application failed to verify which plug-in made
a high-privileged API call, the plug-in would be able to perform actions
beyond what should have been allowed. This can result in data leakage to
unintended plug-ins, arbitrary code execution, same-origin policy bypass.
– Mitigation: Each plug-in must be assigned a unique identifier that acts
as an origin identifier. Then, the plug-and-play environment must check
the origin of requests against a security policy whenever a new incoming
request is made to the plug-and-play execution environment.
– Evidence: There were 13 CVEs caused by this issue. The importance of
checking the origin request is emphasized in [50], as a pre-condition to
keeping the OS kernel secure from malicious extensions as well.
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4.0.4.7 Improper isolation of objects used by plug-ins in the plug-
and-play environment
plug-ins attach to the plug-and-play environment through well-defined
public interfaces/APIs provided by the plug-and-play environment. The inter-
action of Plug-ins and the plug-and-play environment is through these APIs.
Security problems can occur when plug-ins and the plug-and-play environment
share the same objects or data structures of these APIs. As a results, plug-ins
can interfere with the plug-and-play environment or other plug-ins.
– Consequences : Since multiple plug-ins can change the properties of these
objects/data structures, it can negatively interfere with other plug-ins
or with the plug-and-play environment. As a result, these shared objects
create a channel that can be used to leak data or to alter the execution
logic of other plug-ins. They can also introduce race condition problems
leading to crashes of the plug-and-play environment.
– Mitigation: The plug-and-play environment can implement an isolated
object domain solution. Each plug-in (and so the plug-and-play environ-
ment) must have its own copies of objects that are passed to or returned
by an API call. Then, the plug-and-play environment manages these
objects, ensuring that pointers or “object references” used by a plug-
in, are not pointing to objects in another compartment (plug-and-play
environment or other plug-ins).
– Evidence: We found twelve cases of shared objects being used as an
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attack vector. In the literature, we found papers that discuss using
this type of isolated object domain to prevent this vulnerability [33,
50, 56, 57] or that the lack of it causes this vulnerability [38]. In [50],
authors discussed that the solution to isolate OS kernel extensions is to
have them communicate with the kernel through only a set of defined,
exported functions and to keep them from direct access to kernel data
and code.
4.0.5 Plug-ins Request Handling
We found the following types of problems relating to plug-in request
handling:
4.0.5.1 Reentrant event callbacks
Plug-ins can interrupt the execution of the event dispatching mecha-
nism before it has finished, resulting in an unpredictable state. Given that
multiple events may arrive and need to be dispatched to many plug-ins, it is
important to ensure that the callback mechanism in the plug-and-play envi-
ronment performs these operations in an atomic fashion.
– Consequences : The plug-and-play environment can crash or be left in an
unexpected state.
– Mitigation: Dispatch of the event to plug-ins must be atomic such that it
guarantees the integrity of the plug-and-play environment (avoid leaving
the plug-and-play environment in an invalid state).
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– Evidence: We found five vulnerability reports in this category. In our
SLR, we found a plug-and-play environment for automotive control sys-
tems that [27] used atomic operations for reading and writing data in
order to avoid re-entry issues.
4.0.5.2 Plug-ins requests are handled without authorizing plug-ins
that initiate the request
Vulnerabilities arise when the plug-and-play environment accepts any
call from plug-ins without checking whether the plug-in is authorized to make
such an API call.
– Mitigation: There are various mitigation techniques. First, upon a re-
quest, the plug-and-play environment must authorize the plug-in that
initiates a request or subscribes to an event. Second, events must be
decomposed into sensitive and non-sensitive events. Listeners can sub-
scribe to sensitive events if and only if they have enough permissions.
Third, events and APIs specific to the plug-and-play environment must
be hidden from plug-ins.
– Evidence: Five CVEs were traced to this issue. In our SLR we did not
find any research paper that identified this type of vulnerability.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation of Data Collection / Analysis
The process under which the theory has been developed can evaluate
the quality of a theory [17]. In Section 3, we described our research process
and sample outcome of each step in details. We rigorously followed the clas-
sical version of the grounded theory. In each step, we reviewed our process
to assess any deviation. A web-based toolkit with advanced search capabil-
ity was developed for highlighting the key-concepts, conducting the open and
selective coding and generating categories. Memos were shared through a sep-
arate Google document to facilitate concurrent feedback and revision of ideas.
All steps were conducted iteratively: the theoretical sampling of the data pro-
ceeded as we created new catalogs or developed new memos. Additional data
points were collected to help explore the analyst’s hypotheses.
Corbin and Strauss in their seminal article [17] discussed a set of scien-
tific canons that are particularly important for qualitative research. We discuss
the fitness and reliability of our results under these scientific canons: Validity,
Reliability, and Credibility of the data. The data collected for the study in-
cluded actual vulnerabilities and fixes to those vulnerabilities from large-scale
popular open source projects. Furthermore, we used several projects from six
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software domains to conduct our study. Plausibility of theory: In this work
theory is defined as a set of vulnerability concepts (plug-and-play vulnerability,
context, causes, consequences and mitigation techniques). Since the findings
are driven from actual systems, the plausibility of theory is accurate, reflecting
the underlying data. Value of the theory: To the best of our knowledge, there
has not been a previous study of plug-and-play vulnerabilities. Plug-and-play
systems are taking over various application domains, such as Web browsers,
Internet-based apps, operating systems, middlewares, integrated medical sys-
tems, automotive systems, video surveillance and so on [6–8, 27, 28, 35, 50, 61].
The findings of this paper can help developers in these domains better design
and implement plug-and-play systems and avoid common critical vulnerabili-
ties. Reproducibility of the theory: We have released all our data, including
the intermediary key points, codes, categories, memos, and their association
with the underlying CVE data. This will enable the reproducibility of our find-
ings, and we believe by following the same general rules for data collection and
analysis, plus similar conditions, another investigator should be able to arrive
at the same general scheme. Empirical grounding of the research findings:
The results of this study are tied to empirical observations and concrete data




6.1 Overview of Approach
We used formal modeling in order to verify that our proposed mitiga-
tion techniques to common vulnerabilities in plug-and-play architectures were
indeed secure. Architectural description languages can be used to model ar-
chitectural components of a software system. Tools have also been developed
in order to verify whether the provided architecture meets a specific style. [52]
We used Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) to model our
architecture. Then, we used the Assume Guarantee REasoning Environment
(AGREE) to verify the behavior of our models. The declarations of all of our
models can be found in Appendix A.
6.1.1 AADL
We used Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) to model
our architecture. AADL is an architectural description language allows for
analysis to be performed on the models created. AADL uses component types
to specify a static representation of the system architecture. This can be used
to model ”software functionality, software runtime specifications, execution
hardware, hardware and protocols used for connections, and related compo-
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nents such as sensors and actuators”. [25] OSATE is a tool used to create
AADL and perform analysis. AADL can be used to describe a system at
many levels, all the way down to the hardware if necessary. Each layer is
made up of subcomponents from lower levels. This allows us to describe our
architecture in greater detail where necessary, and leave other sections more
abstract to keep them generalizable.
6.1.2 AGREE
We used the Assume Guarantee REasoning Environment (AGREE) to
verify the behavior of our models. AGREE is compositional, attempting to
prove that properties about one layer of the architecture are true based on
properties provided by subcomponents. First, assumptions are written about
each component. These are the things that the component is expecting from
the environment. For example, a plug-in may expect that some data is sent
to it from the core.
Next, guarantees are written, which provide information about what a
component promises to do, given that the assumptions have been met. For
example, our simple plug-in may return the data given to it by the core.
These assumptions and guarantees are added to each component in the
form of an annex. When the top level system is analyzed, the subcompo-
nents are checked to ensure that the assumptions and guarantees about each
subcomponent have been met.
This allows us to create a generalizable model where plug-ins and the
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core are explained, and third party developers can configure their top level
systems as they please. They can then analyze their top level system, and
confirm that the subcomponents used are secure with their configurations.
During the verification phase, AGREE verifies that none of the as-
sumptions contradict one another, and that given the assumptions are met,
the guarantee statements can also be met.
6.2 Basic Example
In the following basic example, we demonstrate how AGREE can val-
idate the assume guarantee statements on the diagram. We model a system
with a very basic core and two plug-ins. We guarantee that the output of
pluginA will be the same as the input of pluginA. In the core, we assume that
the event dispatched to plug-in1 is going to be received in the callback from
pluginA. When we build the top level system, we initially properly connect
the components so that the input and output for the plug-ins match. Figure
6.1 shows the model of the properly connect system and Figure 6.2 shows the
AGREE verification.
However, in the second example, we improperly connect the compo-
nents so that the input from pluginA and pluginB are mixed. In this case, we
see that our AGREE verification has failed, because the input from pluginA
was not the output that was sent to pluginA. Figure 6.3 shows the model of
the improperly connect system and Figure 6.4 shows the AGREE verification.
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Figure 6.1: Basic system correctly connected
6.3 Step 1: Model the Plug-in
We began our modeling by creating the components required for our
reference plug-in. From our architecturally significant requirements, we found
that plug-ins are composed of the following basic components: Initializer,
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Figure 6.2: Basic system correctly connected and verified
Updater, Uninstaller, and Business Logic. The below figures show the code
used to generate the model of the plug-in component, as well as the visual
representation of that model.
These components serve as the base components that we believe should
be present in a plug-in. However, individual developers are welcome to add
separate components to the plug-ins as well. This allows for maximum flex-
ibility so that our method will work in the general case, allowing for use in
multiple domains and implementations.Figure 6.5 shows the completed plug-in
model.
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Figure 6.3: Basic System incorrectly connected
6.4 Step 2: Model the Core
Next, we created a model for our core. Using our architecturally sig-
nificant requirements we determined that the main components of the core
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Figure 6.4: Basic System incorrectly connected and verified
are the Plug-in Registry, Plug-in Manager, and Business Logic. We use these
components to our implementation of the core. However, external developers
can adapt our model to fit their desired needs. We provide each component
of the core that we believe to be necessary for our implementation of a secure
plug and play system. However, in other domains, or for specific projects, a
developer may need to provide more details about their core, or may need to
make modifications. This is permitted through extending our components or
through the addition of more components types. The model generated for our
core is shown in Figure 6.6
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Figure 6.5: Plug-in AADL Model
6.5 Verification
Central Install Point: In order to address the vulnerabilities related
to incorrect user notification of plug-in permissions and bypassing user no-
tifications for plug-in installation, which could result in the consequences of
elevation of privileges, spoofing, user assisted attacks, and stealth installation
of malicious plug-ins, we previously discussed creating a centralized installa-
tion point for all plug-ins.
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Figure 6.6: Core AADL Model
By design, our plug-in implementation contains a central point of in-
stall. All plug-ins that want to be added to the plug-in registry pass through
our initialization component. In order for events to be dispatched to the plug-
in, they must be registered in the core registry component, so that the cores
business logic component knows to dispatch the event.
6.5.1 Plug-ins are kept up to date
Ensuring that the most up to date versions of plug-ins are installed can
help keep the core secure. This can be done by having the plug-in manager be
responsible for checking for installed plug-ins with available updates.
This begins by ensuring that the most up to date version of a plug-
in is installed. We verify this information by providing the assumption the
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plug-in manager will find version 3 of the given plug-in. We then provide the
assumption in our plug-in that the version is 4. Then, we see in the AGREE
verification that this is permitted.
Next, we provide a plug-in where the version is only 2. In this case we
are not able to guarantee that the plug-in is up to date and we see that the
verification fails.
We also provide verification that the current plug-in is up to date. The
core registry confirms the proper plug-in version number and ensures that the
plug-in updater also reflects the same number. We also verify that the plug-
ins are always updated rather than downgraded and that an older, potentially
vulnerable extension is not used to replace a current version.
6.5.2 Plug-in Request Handling
In order the address the vulnerability category of plug-in requests being
handled without authorizing plug-ins that initiate the request, which has been
shown to lead to plug-ins tampering with other plug-ins, data leakage to un-
intended plug-ins, and arbitrary code execution, we previously recommended
three approaches.
The first approach is authorizing the source of the request. Upon re-
quest, a plug and play core must authorize the plug-in that initiates a request
or subscribes to an event. This is made possible through our connection be-
tween the business logic of the core and the core registry. Only installed
plug-ins that have been validated against the plug-in manager will be allowed
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to subscribe to events, as the list of plug-ins subscribed to an event is also
contained within the registry.
The seconds mitigation proposed is decomposing events into sensitive
and non-sensitive events. Listeners should be allowed to subscribe to sensitive
events if and only if they have enough permissions. This is made simple
because the plug-in registry is responsible for both managing the permissions
that plug-ins have and also the events that they are subscribed to.
The third part of the mitigation supplied for the category of vulnera-
bilities is to hide plug and play internal events from the plug-ins. This is the
accomplished by only providing data to plug-ins that involve the events they
are subscribed to.
We are able to verify the first approach by assuming that a token is
passed along with the business logics event dispatch and is returned by the
plug-in during the event callback. This allows us to assume in the core that
the plug-in will return the same token in the callback that it was passed during
the event dispatch. In our plug-in, we guarantee that the token sent in the
dispatch is the same as the one in the callback.
6.6 Case Study: Modeling a Full System
To model the full system, a third party developer could plug and play
our existing components.
Developers can adapt this model in order to meet their own specific
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needs, allowing our work to apply to the general case, and thus assist devel-
opers of plug-and-play systems in any domain. Some examples of places this
could be used are the automotive industry when developing self driving cars,
or the medical domain such as with implantable medical devices and their
ecosystems.
Automotive systems are frequently being built so that telematic control
units (TCUs) can be added to the electronic control units in order to add
additional functionality after market. Some examples of these types of systems
are GM’s Onstar and Progressive Snapshots. In this case study, we will use
the hypothetical system Offstar. [26]
Figure 6.7: Verification for KarzInc Base Car
In the first example, a developer might want to model a base car using
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our provided core and plug-in models. This example makes use of the compo-
nents that had been defined previously in order to build a top level system.
Figure 6.7 shows that the verification completes with no errors.
In addition, a developer could also modify our core and plug-in archi-
tectures in order to have more fine grained control over the architecture of
their system. Our verifications will still work, provided the developer ensures
that they provide the appropriate guarantees in their components. This allows
developers to have control over their architecture, while also forcing develop-
ers to think about the requirements for security and the ways that they will
mitigate potential vulnerabilities.
Figure 6.8 shows how the a car might be connected to a telemetry
device. This example makes use of the components that had been defined
previously in order to build a top level system.
The custom car cannot be verified that the plug-in is returning the
same token that was sent to it during the event dispatch. This indicates to
the developer that they will need to do additional work to ensure that their
system is secure. This can be done by providing guarantees within the custom
models that ensure that the plug-ins will be properly authenticated.
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In this section we discuss construct, internal and external threats to
the validity of this work [55] and how we have mitigated them. Construct
validity is concerned with the degree to which the measurements support the
findings and results of what we were investigating. In our context, this type of
threat is related to whether the measures we have taken for identifying plug-in
based vulnerabilities were accurate enough to back up our findings. The first
threat in this category relates to the quality of the data we collected. In this
study, we used reports from the NVD, which is a well-known and widely used
repository of vulnerabilities. Moreover, we also collected information directly
from issue tracking systems and source code repositories, which represent the
actual developers’ insights and mindset when fixing problems. Therefore, we
consider that these data sources correspond to the highest quality we could
achieve for this type of work. The second threat concerns our automated fil-
tering approach could miss true positives. To mitigate this threat we applied
three complementary filtering approaches in order to increase our recall. In-
ternal validity reflects the extent to which a study minimizes systematic
error or bias so that a causal conclusion can be drawn. One of the main
threats to the internal validity of the research is the extensive manual analy-
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sis of CVE reports to observe patterns of incidence of vulnerabilities in these
plug-and-play systems. Such manual analysis can be prone to biases. How-
ever, to mitigate this threat, our constant comparative analysis and memos
helped us to elaborate on the reasonings behind our codes. Moreover, our
analysis process encompassed five individuals with security background. Ex-
ternal validity refers to the extent to which our results are generalizable
and applicable to other extensible software. One threat is related to limited
number of applications used in our study. In this study we have not covered
applications from energy, medical or automotive domains, however, the results
of SLR confirms that our findings are supported by existing ad-hock studies
and can be expanded to those domains.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
8.0.1 Future Work
Our study could be expanded by providing more verification in our
formal modeling. Currently, we demonstrate the benefit of using formal mod-
eling in this situation by showing how we can verify a few specific properties.
However, this could be expanded to verify many more properties about the
models so that the system is more secure.
This work could also built upon by analyzing the effectiveness of using
formal modeling to see whether developers were more likely to implement
security requirements that were discovered by formal modeling.
8.0.2 Conclusion
We contributed an in-depth discussion of the common types of vulnera-
bilities found in plug-and-play architectures based on data from several widely
used projects. In addition, we a provide an empirically grounded presenta-
tion of architectural mitigations that can minimize the impacts of common
security issues. Furthermore, we used formal modeling to verify whether an










  with Base_Types;
system plugin_initializer
features
Version: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
annex agree{**





Version: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
annex agree{**









TokenReceived: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
TokenReturned: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
annex agree{**







OutputInit: out data port Base_Types::Integer; --init can contain the id 
of the plugin, which is looked up by the core to make sure it is not blacklisted
OutputUpdate: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
OutputUninstall: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
BusinessIn: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
BusinessOut: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
annex agree {**
guarantee "Installed version is the most up to date version": 
OutputInit=3 and OutputUpdate=3;
            guarantee "the plugin will return the token in the callback that it 
recieves in the dispatch": BusinessIn = BusinessOut;
            guarantee "Install the most up to date plugin" : OutputInit = 
OutputUpdate;










Init: port initializer.Version -> OutputInit;
Update: port updater.Version -> OutputUpdate;
Uninstall: port uninstaller.Version -> OutputUninstall;
BusIn: port  BusinessIn -> businessLogic.TokenReceived;




input_init: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
input_updater: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
input_uninstaller: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
outputManager: out data port Base_Types::Integer; 
inputManager: in data port Base_types::Integer;
outputBus: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
annex agree{**
assume "up to date plugin is installed": input_init <= input_updater;






input: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
output: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
PluginID :out data port Base_Types::Integer;




eventCallbacks: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
eventDispatches: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
inPluginList: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
annex agree{**






eventCallbacks: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
eventDispatches: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
inPluginList: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
annex agree{**
!h
assume "Plugins do not send the same id back that you sent them": 





InputInit: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
InputUpdate: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
InputUninstaller: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
OutputEventDispatch: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
InputEventCallbacks: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
InputCheckVersion: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
OutputPluginID: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
annex agree {**
assume "Plugins send the same id back that you sent them" : 
InputEventCallbacks = OutputEventDispatch;
assume "plugins installed are up to date": 
InputCheckVersion = InputInit;







core_BusinessLogic: system core_BusinessLogic; 
coreManager: system core_pluginManager;
connections
EventDispatch: port core_BusinessLogic.eventDispatches -> 
OutputEventDispatch;
EventCallback: port InputEventCallbacks -> 
core_BusinessLogic.eventCallbacks;
Uninstaller: port InputUninstaller -> coreRegistry.input_uninstaller;
Updater: port InputUpdate -> coreRegistry.input_updater;
Initializer: port InputInit -> coreRegistry.input_init;
plug2bus: port coreRegistry.outputBus -> core_BusinessLogic.inPluginList;
plugm2r: port coreRegistry.outputManager -> coreManager.input;
plugr2m: port coreManager.output -> coreRegistry.inputManager;
checkPluginID: port coreManager.PluginID -> OutputPluginID;




InputInit: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
InputUpdate: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
InputUninstaller: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
OutputEventDispatch: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
InputEventCallbacks: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
InputCheckVersion: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
OutputPluginID: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
annex agree {**
!h
assume "Plugins send the same a different id back that you 
sent them" : InputEventCallbacks + 1= OutputEventDispatch;
assume "plugins installed are up to date": 
InputCheckVersion = InputInit;







core_BusinessLogic: system CustomCar_BusinessLogic; 
coreManager: system core_pluginManager;
connections
EventDispatch: port core_BusinessLogic.eventDispatches -> 
OutputEventDispatch;
EventCallback: port InputEventCallbacks -> 
core_BusinessLogic.eventCallbacks;
Uninstaller: port InputUninstaller -> coreRegistry.input_uninstaller;
Updater: port InputUpdate -> coreRegistry.input_updater;
Initializer: port InputInit -> coreRegistry.input_init;
plug2bus: port coreRegistry.outputBus -> core_BusinessLogic.inPluginList;
plugm2r: port coreRegistry.outputManager -> coreManager.input;
plugr2m: port coreManager.output -> coreRegistry.inputManager;
checkPluginID: port coreManager.PluginID -> OutputPluginID;





Input: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
Output: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
annex agree {**





Offstar : system plugin.Impl ;
BaseCar : system Core.Impl ;
connections
InputToCheckVersion: port Input -> BaseCar.InputCheckVersion
{Communication_Properties::Timing => immediate;};
Core_TO_AEvent: port BaseCar.OutputEventDispatch -> Offstar.BusinessIn
{Communication_Properties::Timing => immediate;};
A_TO_CoreInit: port Offstar.OutputInit -> BaseCar.InputInit
{Communication_Properties::Timing => immediate;};
A_TO_CoreUpdate: port Offstar.OutputUpdate -> BaseCar.InputUpdate
{Communication_Properties::Timing => immediate;};




A_TO_CoreEvent: port Offstar.BusinessOut -> BaseCar.InputEventCallbacks
{Communication_Properties::Timing => immediate;};





Input: in data port Base_Types::Integer;
Output: out data port Base_Types::Integer;
annex agree {**





Offstar : system plugin.Impl ;
CustomCar : system CustomCore.Impl ;
connections
InputToCheckVersion: port Input -> CustomCar.InputCheckVersion
{Communication_Properties::Timing => immediate;};
Core_TO_AEvent: port CustomCar.OutputEventDispatch -> Offstar.BusinessIn
{Communication_Properties::Timing => immediate;};
A_TO_CoreInit: port Offstar.OutputInit -> CustomCar.InputInit
{Communication_Properties::Timing => immediate;};
A_TO_CoreUpdate: port Offstar.OutputUpdate -> CustomCar.InputUpdate
{Communication_Properties::Timing => immediate;};
A_TO_CoreUninstall: port Offstar.OutputUninstall -> 
CustomCar.InputUninstaller
{Communication_Properties::Timing => immediate;};
A_TO_CoreEvent: port Offstar.BusinessOut -> CustomCar.InputEventCallbacks
{Communication_Properties::Timing => immediate;};
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[49] Paulo Jorge Costa Nunes, José Fonseca, and Marco Vieira. phpsafe:
A security analysis tool for oop web application plugins. In 2015 45th
Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference onDependable Systems and
Networks (DSN), pages 299–306. IEEE, 2015.
[50] Daniela Oliveira, Jesus Navarro, Nicholas Wetzel, and Max Bucci. Ianus:
Secure and holistic coexistence with kernel extensions - a immune system-
inspired approach. In Proceedings of the 29th Annual ACM Symposium
on Applied Computing, SAC ’14, pages 1672–1679, New York, NY, USA,
2014. ACM.
[51] Jinkun Pan and Xiaoguang Mao. Detecting dom-sourced cross-site script-
ing in browser extensions. In 2017 IEEE International Conference on
Software Maintenance and Evolution (ICSME), pages 24–34. IEEE, 2017.
[52] Akshay Rajhans, Shang-Wen Cheng, Bradley Schmerl, David Garlan,
Bruce H Krogh, Clarence Agbi, and Ajinkya Bhave. An architectural
approach to the design and analysis of cyber-physical systems. Elec-
tronic Communications of the EASST, 21, 2009.
[53] Raghavendra Rajkumar, Andrew Wang, Jason D Hiser, Anh Nguyen-
Tuong, Jack W Davidson, and John C Knight. Component-oriented
monitoring of binaries for security. In 2011 44th Hawaii International
Conference onSystem Sciences (HICSS), pages 1–10. IEEE, 2011.
[54] Konrad Rieck, Tammo Krueger, and Andreas Dewald. Cujo: efficient
detection and prevention of drive-by-download attacks. In Proceedings
75
of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pages
31–39. ACM, 2010.
[55] Per Runeson and Martin Hoest. Guidelines for conducting and reporting
case study research in software engineering. Empirical Software Engi-
neering, 14:131–164, 2009.
[56] Anil Saini, Manoj Singh Gaur, and Vijay Laxmi. The darker side of
firefox extension. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on
Security of Information and Networks, pages 316–320. ACM, 2013.
[57] Anil Saini, Manoj Singh Gaur, Vijay Laxmi, and Priyadarsi Nanda. sand-
fox: Secure sandboxed and isolated environment for firefox browser. In
Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Security of Informa-
tion and Networks, SIN ’15, pages 20–27, New York, NY, USA, 2015.
ACM.
[58] J. H. Saltzer and M. D. Schroeder. The protection of information in
computer systems. Proceedings of the IEEE, 63(9):1278–1308, September
1975.
[59] J. C. S. Santos, A. Peruma, M. Mirakhorli, M. Galster, J. V. Vidal, and
A. Sejfia. Understanding software vulnerabilities related to architectural
security tactics: An empirical investigation of chromium, php and thun-
derbird. In 2017 IEEE International Conference on Software Architecture
(ICSA), pages 69–78, April 2017.
76
[60] H. Shahriar, K. Weldemariam, T. Lutellier, and M. Zulkernine. A model-
based detection of vulnerable and malicious browser extensions. In 2013
IEEE 7th International Conference on Software Security and Reliability,
pages 198–207, June 2013.
[61] Brian Shand and Jem Rashbass. Security for middleware extensions:
Event meta-data for enforcing security policy. In Proceedings of the 2008
Workshop on Middleware Security, MidSec ’08, pages 31–33, New York,
NY, USA, 2008. ACM.
[62] K. J. Stol, P. Ralph, and B. Fitzgerald. Grounded theory in software en-
gineering research: A critical review and guidelines. In 2016 IEEE/ACM
38th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE), pages
120–131, May 2016.
[63] Ming Sun, Dawu Gu, Juanru Li, and Bailan Li. Pyxhon: Dynamic
detection of security vulnerabilities in python extensions. In 2012 In-
ternational Conference on Information Science and Technology (ICIST),
pages 461–466. IEEE, 2012.
[64] Hannes Trunde and Edgar Weippl. Wordpress security: an analysis
based on publicly available exploits. In Proceedings of the 17th Interna-
tional Conference on Information Integration and Web-based Applications
& Services, page 81. ACM, 2015.
[65] G. Varshney, M. Misra, and P. Atrey. Browshing a new way of phishing
77
using a malicious browser extension. In 2017 Innovations in Power and
Advanced Computing Technologies (i-PACT), pages 1–5, April 2017.
[66] James Walden, Maureen Doyle, Rob Lenhof, John Murray, and Andrew
Plunkett. Impact of plugins on the security of web applications. In
Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Security Measurements
and Metrics, page 1. ACM, 2010.
[67] Shangzhu Wang, George S. Avrunin, and Lori A. Clarke. Architec-
tural building blocks for plug-and-play system design. In Ian Gor-
ton, George T. Heineman, Ivica Crnković, Heinz W. Schmidt, Judith A.
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